Effective injury prevention using surveillance data: helicopter logging, Alaska, 1992-1995

To reduce the fatality rate in helicopter sling-load logging in Alaska. These operations--on rugged terrain, due to environmental restrictions and economics--are an emerging technology application worldwide. During 1992 and 1993, crashes during these operations in Alaska resulted in multiple fatalities.

During 1992, comprehensive surveillance for these events was established, combining electronic media and interagency notification with active investigation to identify preventable risk factors. These data were applied in mid-1993 by an interagency working group, which included representatives of the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Alaska Department of Labor, Federal Aviation Administration, National Transportation, Safety Board, U.S. Coast Guard, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Forest Service, and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. In response to surveillance data, consensus safety recommendations were developed. Working closely with industry, immediate improvements were made in worker training, work/rest cycles, and oversight. Surveillance results are being used to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions. On March 1-2, 1995, an international workshop was convened in Ketchikan, Alaska, to involve industry and government agencies in planning for durable prevention in this industry.

In Alaska between January 1, 1992, and June 30, 1993, there were 6 helicopter crashes, with 9 fatal (4 in pilots) and 10 severe nonfatal injuries, out of only 25 helicopters flying in helicopter logging operations. Alaska logging helicopters thus had the extraordinarily high annual crash rate of 16% and a catastrophic pilot fatality rate of 5,000/100,000/year. Investigation revealed that all crashes involved improper operational and/or maintenance practices. Since these recommendations were implemented in July 1993, there have been no additional helicopter logging fatalities in Alaska through 1995. The 1995 meeting resulted in further recommendations, including more vigorous oversight; development of rigorous voluntary industry standards for equipment, maintenance, and training; exclusive use of multi-engine rotocraft; and more vigorous controls on alcohol and drug use in this industry.