From science to evidence: the testimony on causation in the Bendectin cases

Critics of American tort law often question the ability of lay jurors to make factual determinations in trials involving complex scientific evidence. In this article, Professor Sanders attempts to refocus tort reform debate by studying how trial procedures themselves contribute to jurors' inability to properly assess scientific evidence. Professor Sanders' analysis centers on trials involving Bendectin, a drug which plaintiffs have claimed caused birth defects in the children of mothers who took it during pregnancy. After noting that the weight of scientific and federal judicial opinion concludes that plaintiffs cannot establish a causal link between Bendectin use and birth defects by a preponderance of the evidence, Professor Sanders analyzes the transcripts of six Bendectin trials to determine why jury verdicts do not comport with the weight of scientific and judicial opinion. Based on his conclusion that trials are incapable of adequately conveying the weight of scientific opinion to a lay jury, he evaluates the ability of various trial reform proposals to ameliorate this problem. Finally he recommends adopting proposals that would facilitate jurors' understanding of scientific evidence and lead to verdicts consistent with the weight of scientific opinion.