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Consumer information surplus and adverse selection in competitive health insurance markets: an empirical study
W P van de Ven1, R C van Vliet
1Department of Health Policy and Management, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
Abstract:
If premiums for health insurance are not risk related, there exists a consumer information surplus that may result in adverse selection. Our results indicate that insurers can greatly reduce this surplus by risk-adjusting the premium. We conclude that there need not be any substantial unavoidable consumer information surplus if consumers can choose whether to take a deductible for a one- or two-year health insurance contract with otherwise identical benefits. Therefore, adverse selection need not be a problem in a competitive insurance market with risk-adjusted premiums or vouchers and with such a consumer choice of health plan.
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