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Related Experiment Videos

Committee proposals and restrictive rules.

J S Banks1

  • 1Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
|July 8, 1999
PubMed
Summary

In legislative politics, a closed amendment rule is typically chosen over an open rule when policy decisions involve multiple dimensions. This strategic choice in committee-legislature interactions can lead to outcomes very similar to those under an open rule.

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Area of Science:

  • Political Science
  • Game Theory
  • Legislative Studies

Background:

  • Legislative bodies utilize amendment rules to govern the legislative process.
  • Committee-legislature interactions are crucial for policy-making outcomes.
  • Understanding the strategic choice between open and closed rules is key to legislative analysis.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To analyze a game-theoretic model of committee-legislature interaction.
  • To determine the equilibrium outcome of choosing between open and closed amendment rules.
  • To examine the impact of policy space dimensionality on rule selection.

Main Methods:

  • Game-theoretic modeling
  • Analysis of strategic decision-making in legislative contexts

Related Experiment Videos

  • Equilibrium analysis of amendment rule adoption

    • Main Results:

    • The closed amendment rule is overwhelmingly preferred in equilibrium when the policy space dimension exceeds one.
    • The difference in policy outcomes between closed and open rules can be minimal.
    • The model predicts a strong tendency towards closed rules in complex policy environments.

    Conclusions:

    • The dimensionality of the policy space significantly influences the choice of legislative amendment rules.
    • Strategic considerations favor closed rules in multi-dimensional policy settings.
    • The adoption of a closed rule does not necessarily lead to drastically different policy outcomes compared to an open rule.