Evolutionarily stable strategy in a sex- and frequency-dependent selection model
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Updated: Oct 15, 2026

Predicting the Effectiveness of Population Replacement Strategy Using Mathematical Modeling
Published on: July 4, 2007
1Département de Mathématiques et de Statistique, Université de Montréal, Québec, Canada.
Abstract:
In this paper, a sex-dependent matrix game haploid model is investigated. For this model, since the phenotypes of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only if the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. We show that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists.
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