On the place of fuzzy health in medical theory

This commentary on Sadegh-Zadeh's article 'Fuzzy health, illness and disease,' has its focus on the philosophical background for applying fuzzy logic to medical theory. I concentrate on four issues. First, I contest some of Sadegh-Zadeh's statements on the present state of the theory of medicine, in particular with regard to assumptions ascribed to contemporary theorists. Second, I consider Sadegh-Zadeh's interesting idea that a person can have a disease to varying degrees, from not having it at all to having it completely. I argue that there are difficulties pertaining to the definition of particular diseases, which obstruct the application of this idea. The following two points concern medical semantics and principles for definition in general. I take issue with Sadegh-Zadeh's description of the correct procedure for definition. I also contest his unconditional proposal for a social definition of health, illness and disease.