Pre-persons, commodities or cyborgs: the legal construction and representation of the embryo

This paper explores how embryos have been represented in law. It argues that two main models have underpinned legal discourse concerning the embryo. One discourse, which has become increasingly prevalent, views embryos as legal subjects or persons. Such representations are facilitated by technological developments such as ultrasound imaging. In addition to influencing Parliamentary debate prior to the passage of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, images of embryos as persons feature prominently in popular culture, including advertising and films, and this discourse came to the fore in the 'orphaned embryo' debate in 1996. The main opposing discourse dismisses embryos as commodifiable objects, which fits with a trend towards legal recognition that reproductive materials such as sperm may be classified as property which may be donated or sold. In the case of cryopreserved embryos these competing perspectives have resulted in litigation over the status of frozen embryos. In this paper I argue that it might be productive to shift the debate from this polarised dispute over whether embryos matter or not, whether they are pre-persons or commodities. Instead, I suggest that we should attempt to locate them in a biotechnological milieu, where cyborg metaphors may be utilised, and questions of how we should treat embryos would be contextualized alongside our response to other cyborgs.