The epistemology of communitarian bioethics: traditions in the public debates

I consider the problem liberalism poses for bioethics. Liberalism is a view that advocates that the state remain neutral to views of the good life. This view is sometimes supported by a skeptical moral epistemology that tends to propel liberalism toward libertarianism. I argue that the possibilities for shared agreement on moral matters are more promising than is sometimes appreciated by such a view of liberalism. Using two examples of public debates of moral issues, I show that commonly shared intuitions may ground moral principles even if they may be given different weight by persons of different moral and religious traditions. Nevertheless, the fact that the intuition and principle is widely shared may be sufficient to chart some directions for public policy or cooperative action even if they do not lead to complete agreement. As a result, I argue that a liberal communitarianism that presupposes a fairly minimalist epistemology is a legitimate approach to achieving shared agreement in a pluralistic society.