The biomedical model and just health care: reply to Jecker

... Some philosophers of medicine have criticized the biomedical model on which I draw (Daniels 1985, Ch. 2) on the grounds that the notion of disease is a value-laden concept, not the objective, theoretical notion presupposed by the biomedical model, and Jecker seems to agree with these criticisms. But whatever the merits of those criticisms, they are different from Professor Jecker's complaint. Professor Jecker's central argument is that my appeal to the biomedical model smuggles in particular conceptions of what is good in life, whereas the choice situation in which people agree on principles of justice should use a thin conception of the good that is neutral, not biased in this way. She also suggests that the results of prudent choice under my constraints fail to match our considered moral judgments in reflective equilibrium. I think neither criticism is successful....