Hypothetical contractarianism and the disclosure requirement problem in informed consent

Two of the more deeply problematic issues surrounding the doctrine of informed consent are providing a justification for the practice of informed consent and providing an account of the nature and amount of information that must be disclosed in order for informed consent to take place. This paper is concerned with the latter problem, the problem of disclosure requirements, but it deals with this problem in a novel way; it approaches the problem by asking what fully informed and fully rational agents would agree to under certain hypothetical conditions. In general terms I juxtapose the hypothetical contractarianism found in Rawls' A Theory of Justice with that found in Gauthier's Morals By Agreement and ask what their respective hypothetical contractors would agree to with respect to choosing a particular standard of disclosure to govern the practice of informed consent. In more specific terms a contrast is made between what a Rawlsian agent behind a veil of ignorance would choose as compared to what, in Gauthier's terms, an ideal actor making an Archimedean choice would choose. The idea of an Archimedean point, and the subsequent choice made from that point, although technically identified by Rawls, originated with Archimedes of Syracuse.