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Newborn infants and the moral significance of intellectual disabilities
1University of Jyvaskyla, Finland.
Insights
Intellectual disability should not prevent infants from receiving life-saving medical treatment. Arguments that children with disabilities are a burden are challenged, emphasizing well-being through social connections.
Area of Science:
- Bioethics
- Philosophy of Medicine
- Disability Studies
Background:
- Medical ethics often face dilemmas concerning resource allocation for life-saving treatments.
- Societal biases and philosophical arguments sometimes question the value of life for individuals with intellectual disabilities.
- Existing ethical frameworks may not adequately address the specific moral considerations for infants with disabilities.
Purpose of the Study:
- To present moral philosophical arguments concerning the allocation of life-saving medical treatment for infants.
- To critically examine the notion that intellectual disability justifies withholding life-saving care.
- To propose an alternative ethical perspective on human well-being and disability.
Main Methods:
- Moral philosophical argumentation
- Analysis of ethical concepts related to disability and well-being
- Critique of consequentialist and societal burden arguments
Main Results:
- The argument that children with disabilities are an inherent burden is refuted.
- Human well-being is demonstrated to be relational, not solely based on individual characteristics.
- Intellectual disability is shown not to be a sufficient moral reason for denying life-saving treatment.
Conclusions:
- Withholding life-saving medical treatment based on intellectual disability is ethically unjustified.
- Ethical considerations for infants with disabilities must prioritize their right to life and well-being.
- A relational understanding of well-being supports inclusive medical ethics for all infants.
Abstract:
This article presents moral philosophical arguments regarding life-saving medical treatment that may be more available to infants without disabilities than to infants with intellectual disabilities. The ideas are that children with disabilities are a burden to their families and to society and that a happy life may not be attainable for these children and their families. I argue that human well-being is not based merely on individual characteristics, but is a result of the individual's relation to other people. Further, children with disabilities are not inevitably a burden to their families or society. Accordingly, intellectual disability is not a sufficient reason for withholding life-saving treatment.