On Darwin's 'metaphysical notebooks'. II: "Metaphysics" and final cause

The first part of this paper was published in Rivista di Biologia/Biology Forum 94 (2001). In the second part below an examination is made of the meaning of the term Metaphysics in some passages of the Darwinian Notebooks for the years 1836-1844. Metaphysics no longer defines a field of philosophical enquiries mainly concerning the being and the essence after the manner of Aristotle; it now refers to a kind of philosophy of mind after the manner of J. Locke's criticism of the Hypokeimenon. However Aristotle's Metaphysics also encompasses a treatment of the idea of causes, and of final cause particularly, in the explanation of events, and in the explanation of natural phenomena especially. The criticism of the idea of final cause in the interpretation of the world of life is one of Darwin's foundational acts in his early years. When conceiving his Système du monde, in the last years of the XVIII Century, Laplace could think that God is a hypothesis not really needed by science, as we are told. For the knowledge of organic nature to attain the status of science, it remained to be shown that since--certain of the exemplariness of Newton's Principles as much as cautious before the mystery of life--did not need the hypothesis of final ends in order to understand and explain the productions of the living nature: not only in the form of that final cause (the First Cause, the Vera Causa) in which Natural Theology still rested, but also in the form of nature's inner finality which still moulded Whewell's Kantian philosophy. Such demonstration is a very important subject in Darwin's early enquiries, where he criticises finalism as a projection of self-conceiving Man, likely inherited from a knowing of causality in nuce to be found also in animals.