Gerwirth's ethical rationalism and abortion: a response

Area of Science:

• Moral Philosophy
• Ethics
• Bioethics

Background:

• Alan Gewirth's "Reason and Morality" (1978) posits rational justification as central to moral principles.
• Critiques of Gewirth's framework often focus on the definition and application of personhood.

Purpose of the Study:

• To critically evaluate Alan Gewirth's ethical framework, specifically his concept of personhood.
• To identify logical inconsistencies and conceptual weaknesses in Gewirth's arguments regarding personhood and abortion.
• To propose an alternative, functionally-defined model of personhood.

Main Methods:

• Analysis of Gewirth's "Reason and Morality" (1978).
• Deconstruction of Gewirth's arguments on personhood quantification and "comparable conflict."
• Development of a contrasting, functional definition of personhood.

Main Results:

• Gewirth's attempt to quantify personhood is deemed unrealistic.
• His position on abortion is based on the unclear notion of "comparable conflict."
• Gewirth implicitly assumes a natural, rather than functional, definition of personhood, leading to self-contradiction.

Conclusions:

• Gewirth's ethical theory contains significant conceptual flaws regarding personhood.
• An alternative functional view of personhood offers a more robust and consistent ethical framework.
• This functional approach avoids the criticisms inherent in naturalistic definitions of personhood.