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Related Experiment Videos

Intra-family bargaining and time allocation.

P S Carlin

    Research in Population Economics
    |January 1, 1991
    PubMed
    Summary
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    Home investment in husband's human capital and the wife's decision to work.

    Journal of population economicsยท1991
    See all related articles

    This study explores how changes in bargaining power affect married couples' time use. It suggests noncooperative game theory may better model family decisions when partners' preferences are unknown.

    Area of Science:

    • Family Economics
    • Game Theory
    • Household Decision-Making

    Background:

    • Cooperative bargaining models assume spouses know each other's utility functions.
    • Many family decisions involve imperfect information about partner preferences.
    • This challenges the applicability of purely cooperative models in certain contexts.

    Purpose of the Study:

    • To investigate empirical implications of bargaining models on spousal time allocation.
    • To examine the effect of threat point variations on husband and wife time decisions.
    • To explore the utility of noncooperative game theory for modeling specific family decisions.

    Main Methods:

    • Utilizes a cooperative game theory approach for initial analysis.
    • Proposes a two-period model for human capital investment and time allocation.
    Keywords:
    AmericasBehaviorDecision MakingDemographic FactorsDeveloped CountriesEconomic FactorsFamily And HouseholdFamily CharacteristicsFinancial ActivitiesHuman CapitalHuman ResourcesHusband-wife CommunicationInterpersonal RelationsInvestmentsModels, TheoreticalNorth AmericaNorthern AmericaPartner CommunicationPopulationPopulation DynamicsResearch MethodologyTime FactorsUnited States

    Related Experiment Videos

  • Employs data from a University of Michigan study on couples' time-allocation patterns across 37 U.S. states and D.C.

    • Main Results:

    • Highlights the limitations of cooperative bargaining models when preferences are unknown.
    • Suggests noncooperative frameworks may be more suitable for modeling certain family bargaining scenarios.
    • Empirically examines the link between bargaining power and spousal time allocation.

    Conclusions:

    • Family decision-making, particularly regarding investments like human capital, may require noncooperative modeling.
    • Threat point variations significantly influence spousal time allocation.
    • Future research should consider noncooperative game theory for a more accurate representation of family bargaining.