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Intrafamily relations, migration and remittances.
Artha Vijnana : Journal of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona (India) = Artha Vijnana : Gokhale Artha Sastra Samstha Dvara Prakasita Traimesika Patrika
|March 1, 1993
Summary
This study models family migration and remittances as a cooperative game, where decisions maximize family welfare. Bargaining power influences migration choices and remittance distribution in developing countries.
Area of Science:
- Economics
- Sociology
- Development Studies
Background:
- Migration is a significant phenomenon in developing countries.
- Family decisions regarding migration and remittances are complex.
- Existing models may not fully capture interdependent decision-making.
Purpose of the Study:
- To develop a formal model of interdependent family decision-making on migration and remittances.
- To view migration as a strategy for maximizing family welfare.
- To analyze the role of bargaining power in migration and remittance decisions.
Main Methods:
- Formal modeling of interdependent decision-making.
- Game theory approach to model family interrelationships.
- Analysis of cooperative game dynamics and implicit co-insurance systems.
Main Results:
- Migration is framed as a family welfare-maximizing strategy.
- Remittances are modeled as a requirement for gain distribution.
- Bargaining strength of migrant and family determines migration and remittances.
Conclusions:
- The model provides a framework for understanding family migration dynamics.
- Interdependent decision-making and bargaining power are key factors.
- The model is applicable to migration patterns in developing countries.