A critique of Oaksford, Chater, and Larkin's (2000) conditional probability model of conditional reasoning

M. Oaksford, N. Chater, and J. Larkin (2000) proffered a Bayesian model in which conditional inferences are a direct function of conditional probabilities. In the current article, the authors first considered this model regarding the processing of negatives in conditional reasoning. Its predictions were evaluated against a large-scale meta-analysis (W. J. Schroyens, W. Schaeken, & G. d'Ydewalle, 2001b). This evaluation shows that the model is flawed: The relative size of the negative effects does not match predictions. Next, the authors evaluated the model in relation to inferences about affirmative conditionals, again considering the results of a meta-analysis (W. J. Schroyens, W. Schaeken, & G. d'Ydewalle, 2001a). The conditional probability model is countered by the data reported in literature; a mental models based model produces a better fit. The authors conclude that a purely probabilistic model is deficient and incomplete and cannot do without algorithmic processing assumptions if it is to advance toward a descriptively adequate psychological theory.