Paternalism and egregious harm: Prader-Willi Syndrome and the importance of care

Paternalism clashes with the usual liberal model. In this paper I argue that attempts to defend even a limited form of paternalism by liberal authors such as Joel Feinberg, Gerald Dworkin and H.L.A. Hart fail. I propose instead a bivalent model for paternalism that appeals to two separate principles: the no-harm principle and the care-principle. The notion of care discussed by contemporary feminist authors is a fundamental moral archetype that permeates history and culture. I go on to consider the case of patients with Prader-Willi Syndrome and argue that paternalism is not only permissible but imperative in cases in egregious harm. This view is enshrined in common law jurisprudence which dismisses consent as a justification in serious crime.