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Landmarks in territory partitioning: a strategically stable convention?
Michael Mesterton-Gibbons1, Eldridge S Adams
1Department of Mathematics, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306-4510, USA. mmestert@mailer.fsu.edu
The American Naturalist
|July 15, 2003
Summary
Animals may accept smaller territories using landmarks as boundary markers. This game-theoretic model explains how conventions resolve disputes, even with imperfect information on fighting ability, promoting stable territory boundaries.
Area of Science:
- Behavioral Ecology
- Game Theory
- Evolutionary Biology
Background:
- Conventions are rules for dispute resolution using arbitrary cues.
- The Bourgeois strategy is an example where the second animal to find a resource yields to the first.
- Territorial disputes can be protracted without clear boundary markers.
Purpose of the Study:
- To model how conventions, specifically landmarks, can facilitate territory partitioning between neighbors with imperfect information.
- To investigate the conditions under which animals accept smaller territories via conventions rather than fighting.
Main Methods:
- Development of a game-theoretic model.
- Analysis of neighbor interactions with imperfect information on fighting abilities.
- Examination of territory partitioning strategies.
Main Results:
- Neighbors with imperfect information may favor landmarks for territory boundaries, even if it means accepting a smaller area.
- A low variance and high skew in fighting ability distribution increases the probability of accepting a smaller territory.
- Landmarks serve as effective conventions for territory partitioning.
Conclusions:
- Landmarks can explain the widespread use of boundary markers in territorial animals across various taxa.
- The use of conventions like landmarks contributes to the stability of established territory boundaries.
- This model provides insights into the evolution of territorial behavior and conflict resolution.