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Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy
Chris T Bauch1, Alison P Galvani, David J D Earn
1Department of Mathematics and Statistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada L8S 4K1. cbauch@uoguelph.ca
Summary
Voluntary smallpox vaccination may not achieve sufficient herd immunity due to self-interest, increasing mortality risk. Game theory and epidemic modeling reveal a conflict between individual choice and public health goals for bioterrorism preparedness.
Area of Science:
- Public Health Policy
- Epidemiology
- Game Theory
Background:
- The threat of bioterrorism has intensified discussions regarding smallpox vaccination policies in the United States.
- Current policy considerations include voluntary mass vaccination strategies.
Purpose of the Study:
- To analyze the conflict between individual self-interest and group interest in voluntary vaccination programs.
- To evaluate the effectiveness of voluntary smallpox vaccination in achieving optimal herd immunity against bioterrorism.
Main Methods:
- Integration of game theory principles with epidemic modeling.
- Formalization of the decision-making process for vaccination based on self-interest versus group benefit.
Main Results:
- Voluntary vaccination strategies are unlikely to achieve the group-optimal level of herd immunity.
- A significant shortfall in vaccination coverage is predicted when individuals act based on self-interest.
- This shortfall leads to a substantial increase in expected mortality following a bioterrorism attack.
Conclusions:
- Individual decision-making in voluntary vaccination programs may not align with public health objectives.
- Relying solely on voluntary vaccination may compromise population-level protection against bioterrorism.
- The study highlights the need for policies that reconcile individual incentives with the collective need for herd immunity.