Action theory, disability and ICF

The purpose of this paper is to make a critical analysis of the conceptual platform of the recently introduced International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). Special attention is paid to the suggested definitions of the concepts of activity and participation. My argument intends to show that these definitions are not coherent.

The theoretical platform of this paper is philosophical action theory. My argument makes particular use of the distinction between capacity and opportunity and shows that both concepts are applicable to all actions. Capacity and opportunity are distinguished from the actual performance of actions. The latter presupposes the existence of a will. On this conceptual basis follows an analysis of the distinction between activity and participation as conceived by the WHO in ICF.

The main conclusion of my reasoning is that the notions of activity and participation in ICF partly rest on confusion between capacity for action and the actual performance of an action. If my conclusion is sound this has far-reaching consequences for the application of the ICF in the practice of rehabilitation. My diagnosis therefore is that the conceptual framework of ICF is in great need of a strict action--theoretic reconstruction.