Behavioural endocrinology and reproduction: an evolutionary perspective

It is a fact that those interested in immediate causation tend to be unaware of the great advances in evolutionary biology. Similarly, most scientists interested in ecological and evolutionary questions ignore advances in neurobiology and molecular biology. Quite simply, 'reductionists see little to be gained from holistic studies, and whole organism biologists do not recognize the value of molecular analysis' (Prosser 1986). This philosophical gap and lack of communication between molecular and physiological biologists with organismal and evolutionary biologists makes it difficult to be a generalist. Yet if we are to understand past, present, and perhaps even future behaviour, we must study how the different levels of biological organization are integrated. If done with foresight, it can lead to new discoveries not only in evolution and ecology, but also in physiology and even molecular biology. One of the first things we are impressed by is the great variety of animals, particularly their behaviours and their physiologies. With so many differences, are there any generalities? With the establishment of evolutionary theory, evidence that there is 'unity in diversity' has come with discoveries of common anatomical features, the cell cycle, conservation of intermediary metabolism, and the genetic code, to name but a few. While in vertebrates there appears to be a conservation of the neural circuits underlying sex behaviour, it is still too early to state the extent to which this concept can be extended to the hormonal mechanisms underlying behaviour. This chapter has documented how some widely-held assumptions are generalities only in a very restricted sense. I have tried to show how much of our conceptual understanding of the behavioural endocrinology stems from extensive studies on relatively few species. According to (Beach 1979), there are '... two cardinal rules that should govern not only the construction of animal models for human behaviour, but for all interspecific comparisons regardless of the behaviour and the species involved. The first rule is that meaningful comparisons are based not upon the formal characteristics of behaviour, but upon its causal mechanisms and functional outcomes.... The second rule is that the validity of interspecific generalization cannot exceed the reliability of intraspecific analysis. Significant comparison of a particular type of behaviour in two different species is impossible unless and until the behaviour has been adequately analyzed in each species by itself.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)