What is life? Prerequisites for a definition

Biologists view life as transient while theologians see it as eternal. An unbiased definition for life would respect both views until one or both were eliminated by evidence. This paper identifies pre-requisites for such a definition. First among these is that all assumptions be made explicit. Currently "life" is surrounded by implicit assumptions, e.g., that it is what organisms lose at death or that it is eternal, that its quality is inversely related to personal distress, that it originated some four billion years ago, and that animate matter can be distinguished from inanimate matter. None of these assumptions are supported by data. It is possible therefore that "life" is as meaningless as phlogiston. If life has meaning, i.e., if it is true, it must be as permanent as buoyancy, gravity, electricity, and the other truths of nature. Any definition for life that would permit such truth to be seen must be free of unwarranted assumptions. For the moment, at least, such a definition would need to be loosely structured and broadly focused. It would need to describe the long and convoluted process by which matter and energy form organisms which then evolve to form conscious organisms which then explore nature and eventually discover truth. Such a definition would include all the reactions and interactions of matter and energy and all the aspects of conscious discovery. It would suffer from superficiality, but, by being free from bias, provide a foundation for dialogue between biologists and theologians.