Toward an empirical approach to evidentiary ruling.

Area of Science:

• Forensic Science
• Legal Psychology
• Evidence Law

Background:

• Criticisms of the maximum probative value of evidence measure (Davis & Follette, 2002) and its conclusions on prejudicial "intuitive profiling" evidence.
• Debate surrounding the validity of evidence measures and the role of motive in legal profiling.
• Misinterpretations of legal standards, such as the presumption of innocence, in evaluating evidence.

Purpose of the Study:

• To respond to criticisms and misconstruals of the maximum probative value of evidence measure.
• To address the potentially prejudicial role of intuitive profiling evidence, including motive.
• To compare the absolute difference measure of probative value with the Bayesian likelihood ratio.

Main Methods:

• Rebuttal of criticisms by Friedman and Park (2003) by highlighting violations of the presumption of innocence.
• Comparative analysis of the absolute difference measure and the Bayesian likelihood ratio for evidence evaluation.
• Development of recommendations for presenting evidence utility, considering the interdependence of evidence.

Main Results:

• Criticisms by Friedman and Park (2003) are largely based on inappropriate violations of the presumption of innocence.
• The absolute difference measure of probative value offers a viable alternative to the Bayesian likelihood ratio.
• Complexities of evidence interdependence require careful presentation methods.

Conclusions:

• The maximum probative value of evidence measure is robust and defended against criticisms.
• Intuitive profiling evidence, particularly motive, can be unduly prejudicial.
• A probable cause standard is recommended for admitting potentially prejudicial evidence, requiring substantial supporting guilt evidence.