Does the non-identity problem block a class of arguments against cloning?

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Philosophy of Technology
• Reproductive Ethics

Background:

• Contemporary arguments against human cloning often cite potential harm to the cloned individual.
• The non-identity problem, a philosophical concept, questions the moral implications of actions affecting future individuals who would not otherwise exist.

Purpose of the Study:

• To investigate whether Parfit's non-identity problem can be used to counter arguments against human cloning based on negative consequences.
• To analyze the applicability of existing non-identity problem solutions to the specific case of human cloning.

Main Methods:

• Examination of two general strategies for resolving the non-identity problem: consequentialist and non-consequentialist (rights-based) approaches.
• Application of these strategies to standard non-identity problem scenarios and to the context of human cloning.

Main Results:

• Both consequentialist and non-consequentialist strategies offer plausible solutions to the non-identity problem in typical philosophical examples.
• However, these strategies do not adequately address the non-identity problem when it is applied to the ethics of human cloning.

Conclusions:

• The non-identity problem remains a significant philosophical challenge when evaluating arguments against human cloning.
• Existing solutions to the non-identity problem do not fully neutralize the ethical concerns regarding the consequences for cloned individuals.