[Again on language of biology]

Some time ago I proposed in an Editorial in this journal some considerations on the language of biology. I concluded that, to realize an autonomy of such a language (and therefore of biology), we have to develop a valid language for biology. In such a context, it seemed to me that the term "metaphors" referred to the concepts concerning the information carried by genetic code, was a reasonable one. However, Barbieri's article in this issue of Rivista di Biologia / Biology Forum calls for a reply. Of course, we do not know very much in this field, even if we have some evidence that a sequence of bases on a DNA is not determined only by chance. In any case we can exclude that nature in this occasion has "invented" a code. Nature doesn't "invent" anything: it only follows its rules, that we name "laws of nature". Barbieri quotes the Morse code, but forgets to say that such a code is "conventional" in the sense that it is valid only because it is the result of an "agreement" between Morse and the users of that code. There is nothing more unnatural than a "code": with whom nature should actually have to "reach an agreement"? As a matter of fact, we interpret as "information" what happens by law of nature. Also Barbieri's thesis that genes and proteins are molecular artifacts, assembled by external agents, whereas generally molecules are determined by their bonds, i.e. by internal factors, is a disputable one. It is examined how much an external structure plays a role in ordinary chemical reactions. The "information" of physics is not a semantic information. For such information we can refer to history of literature, telegraphic offices, genetics or biochemistry.