Savulescu's objections to the future of value argument

Area of Science:

• Bioethics
• Moral Philosophy
• Reproductive Ethics

Background:

• Julian Savulescu's 2002 objections challenged the future of value argument concerning abortion.
• The core of the debate lies in whether potential future experiences justify moral status.

Purpose of the Study:

• To respond to and refute specific objections raised by Savulescu.
• To re-evaluate the implications of the future of value argument in abortion ethics.
• To critically assess properties proposed as bases for distinguishing wrongful from permissible killing.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and critical analysis.
• Examination of Savulescu's claims regarding future of value argument implications.
• Analysis of properties (e.g., acquired post-implantation) as moral determinants.

Main Results:

• The future of value argument does not entail the implausible implications Savulescu suggested.
• Properties acquired after implantation are insufficient to morally distinguish between wrongful and permissible killing.
• Savulescu's objections are deemed inadequate to undermine the future of value argument.

Conclusions:

• The future of value argument remains a viable ethical framework for discussing abortion.
• The moral permissibility of abortion is not adequately addressed by focusing solely on post-implantation properties.
• Further philosophical inquiry is needed to establish robust criteria for moral distinctions in abortion debates.