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A microbial modified prisoner's dilemma game: how frequency-dependent selection can lead to random phase variation
Denise M Wolf1, Vijay V Vazirani, Adam P Arkin
1Physical Biosciences Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 1 Cyclotron Road, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA. dmwolf@lbl.gov
Journal of Theoretical Biology
|March 11, 2005
Summary
Random phase variation (RPV) can enhance bacterial survival in frequency-dependent environments by creating population diversity. However, an optimal RPV rate is not evolutionarily stable, leading to population fitness loss due to individual defection.
Area of Science:
- Microbiology
- Evolutionary Biology
- Theoretical Biology
Background:
- Random phase variation (RPV) is a gene expression strategy where cells alternate between 'on' and 'off' states.
- While common in bacteria, the specific advantages of RPV under different selective pressures remain unclear.
Purpose of the Study:
- To investigate the conditions under which RPV provides a survival advantage.
- To analyze RPV's role in frequency-dependent environments and its evolutionary stability.
Main Methods:
- Theoretical modeling of RPV dynamics in fluctuating and frequency-dependent environments.
- Analysis of RPV's impact on population heterogeneity and growth rates.
- Comparison of RPV strategies with population polymorphism and game theory models.
Main Results:
- Slow RPV rates confer survival benefits in frequency-dependent environments by generating population heterogeneity.
- Optimal RPV rates can increase population growth but are evolutionarily unstable.
- Individual cells have an incentive to deviate from optimal RPV rates, mirroring a modified Prisoner's Dilemma.
Conclusions:
- RPV offers a survival advantage in specific environmental contexts, particularly frequency-dependent ones.
- The evolutionary instability of optimal RPV highlights a conflict between individual incentives and population fitness.
- RPV dynamics can be understood through the lens of game theory, with optimal rates representing a cooperative strategy vulnerable to defection.