The behavioral economics of violence

From the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism the first question to ask in attempting to understand any behavior, including violent behavior, is: What are its contingencies of reward and punishment? Or, to put the question in economic terms: What are the short-term and long-term costs and benefits that such behavior entails? Let us therefore consider the costs and benefits of youth violence. Among the short-term costs of violent behavior are the physical effort of the act, the possibility of immediate physical retaliation, immediate social disapproval, and the opportunity cost of other social acts that the violent behavior takes the place of (you can't be affectionate and violent at the same time, for instance). Among the immediate benefits of violent behavior are the intrinsic satisfaction of the violent act itself and any extrinsic benefit; if A violently appropriates B's new sneakers then obtaining the sneakers reinforces A's violence. These immediate benefits may well outweigh the costs in many contexts. Among the long-term costs of violent behavior are delayed retaliation, possible social disapproval and loss of social support, rejection from a social group, job loss, and health risks associated with a violent lifestyle. Among the long-term benefits are long-term intimidation of others (your neighbor is less likely to build a fence on your property if you have a reputation for violence), and a possibly exciting lifestyle. These long-term benefits may well be outweighed by the long-term costs. Opposition of long-term net costs to short-term net benefits, where it exists, creates a personal self-control trap: Overall satisfaction may decrease monotonically with rate of the target behavior but, regardless of its rate, the immediate satisfaction of doing it is always higher than that of not doing it. In the case of violent behavior, this trap is exacerbated by the fact that as a person's violence increases, net immediate reinforcement also increases (due to membership in violence-reinforcing subgroups). This contingency fits the "primrose path" addiction model of Prelec and Herrnstein. Violence is thus a paradigm case of behavioral addiction. I consider three ways of controlling such addictive behavior: by punishment, by extinction, and by substitution. The problem with punishment in the case of violence is that physical punishment tends to increase violent behavior while incarceration drives the punished person into the very social subgroup (the prison culture) where violence is maximally reinforced. The problem with extinction is that the immediate benefits of violent behavior are largely intrinsic and some costs (immediate retaliation by unidentified others) are difficult to control. The best way to control violent behavior, as well as other addictive behaviors, is by decreasing the price of economic substitutes. There is much evidence that addictions, such as to cocaine, heroin, alcohol, and tobacco, may be reduced by decreasing the price of social support. The same is predicted for violent behavior--either by providing social support directly or by training in social skills. In addition, in considering control of violent behavior, we need to examine the immediate benefits and long-term costs to society of having violent individuals and violence-reinforcing subcultures among us. And we need to act to reduce our own dependence on those benefits.