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Updated: Aug 17, 2026

Predicting the Effectiveness of Population Replacement Strategy Using Mathematical Modeling
Published on: July 4, 2007
Population dynamics with a stable efficient equilibrium
Jacek MieKisz1, Tadeusz Płatkowski
1Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, Warsaw University, ul. Banacha 2, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland. miekisz@mimuw.edu.pl
Abstract:
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two evolutionarily stable strategies: the efficient one in which the population is in a state with a maximal payoff and the risk-dominant one where players are averse to risk. We show that for a large range of parameters of our dynamics, even if the initial conditions in both habitats are in the basin of attraction of the risk-dominant equilibrium (with respect to the standard replication dynamics without migration), in the long run most individuals play the efficient strategy.
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