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Rethinking the ontogeny of mindreading
Maurizio Tirassa1, Francesca Marina Bosco, Livia Colle
1Università di Torino, Dipartimento di Psicologia e Centro di Scienza Cognitiva, via Po, 14, 10123 Torino, Italy. tirassa@psych.unito.it
Consciousness and Cognition
|August 16, 2005
Summary
Human infants possess an innate "sharedness" capability, allowing them to perceive their mental states as known by others from birth. This foundational ability enables early mentalistic interactions and the later development of mindreading skills.
Area of Science:
- Developmental Psychology
- Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Mind
Background:
- Understanding the origins of mindreading (theory of mind) is crucial for explaining human social cognition.
- Previous theories have debated whether mindreading is learned or innate.
Purpose of the Study:
- To propose a mentalistic and nativist framework for early human mental and social development.
- To define and explain the concept of "sharedness" as a primitive, innate capability.
Main Methods:
- Theoretical proposal based on philosophical and psychological reasoning.
- Analysis of early child-caregiver interactions from a mentalistic perspective.
Main Results:
- Introduces "sharedness" as a one-sided, innate capacity where infants assume their mental states are known by interactants.
- Argues this capability underpins early mentalistic interaction and the subjective sense of self and world.
- Suggests sharedness is the foundation for the later development of understanding differing mental states (mindreading) and the emergence of privateness.
Conclusions:
- Human infants are equipped with an innate "sharedness" mechanism facilitating early social-mental life.
- This innate capacity provides the groundwork for the ontogeny of mindreading and the development of a private self.