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Related Experiment Videos

Equilibria, prudent compromises, and the "waiting" game.

Kwang Mong Sim1

  • 1The Institute of Information Science, Academia Sinica, Nankang, Taipei, Taiwan, ROC. kmsim@iis.sinica.edu.tw

IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. Part B, Cybernetics : a Publication of the IEEE Systems, Man, and Cybernetics Society
|September 1, 2005
PubMed
Summary

This study analyzes market-driven agents (MDAs) for e-negotiations, proving their strategies are stable and optimal. MDAs ensure minimal concessions, forming equilibria in both bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

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Area of Science:

  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Game Theory
  • Computational Economics

Background:

  • Empirical studies commonly evaluate e-negotiation agents.
  • Existing literature lacks analysis of agent design based on equilibrium and strategy stability.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To analyze the design of market-driven agents (MDAs) using equilibrium points and stable strategies.
  • To complement existing empirical evaluations of e-negotiation agents.

Main Methods:

  • Modeling e-negotiation as a game of incomplete information (gamma).
  • Analyzing agent strategies in terms of equilibrium concepts.
  • Investigating bilateral and multilateral negotiation scenarios.

Main Results:

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  • Market-driven agents (MDAs) achieve optimal negotiation through minimally sufficient concessions.
  • MDA strategies are proven to be stable within the game gamma.
  • In bilateral negotiations, MDA strategy pairs form a sequential equilibrium.
  • In multilateral negotiations, MDA strategy profiles constitute a market equilibrium.

    • Conclusions:

    • The design of market-driven agents (MDAs) leads to stable and optimal negotiation outcomes.
    • The game-theoretic model provides a robust framework for understanding e-negotiation agent behavior.
    • This research offers theoretical insights into the design of effective automated negotiation systems.