The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity

The theory of indirect reciprocation explains the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals, engaging in one-shot interaction. Using reputation, a player acquires information on who are worth cooperating and who are not. In a previous paper, we formalized the reputation dynamics, a rule to assign a binary reputation (good or bad) to each player when his action, his current reputation, and the opponent's reputation are given. We then examined all the possible reputation dynamics, and found that there exist only eight reputation dynamics named "leading eight" that can maintain the ESS with a high level of cooperation, even if errors are included in executing intended cooperation and in reporting the observation to the public. In this paper, we study the nature of these successful social norms. First, we characterize the role of each pivot of the reputation dynamics common to all of the leading eight. We conclude that keys to the success in indirect reciprocity are to be nice (maintenance of cooperation among themselves), retaliatory (detection of defectors, punishment, and justification of punishment), apologetic, and forgiving. Second, we prove the two basic properties of the leading eight, which give a quantitative evaluation of the ESS condition and the level of cooperation maintained at the ESS.