Jove
Visualize
Contact Us
JoVE
x logofacebook logolinkedin logoyoutube logo
ABOUT JoVE
OverviewLeadershipBlogJoVE Help Center
AUTHORS
Publishing ProcessEditorial BoardScope & PoliciesPeer ReviewFAQSubmit
LIBRARIANS
TestimonialsSubscriptionsAccessResourcesLibrary Advisory BoardFAQ
RESEARCH
JoVE JournalMethods CollectionsJoVE Encyclopedia of ExperimentsArchive
EDUCATION
JoVE CoreJoVE BusinessJoVE Science EducationJoVE Lab ManualFaculty Resource CenterFaculty Site
Terms & Conditions of Use
Privacy Policy
Policies

Related Experiment Videos

Thought insertion, cognitivism, and inner space.

Tim Thornton1

  • 1Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK.

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
|March 31, 2006
PubMed
Summary
This summary is machine-generated.

Related Concept Videos

You might also read

Related Articles

Articles linked to this work by shared authors, journal, and citation graph.

Sort by
Same author

Operationalism and its discontents.

The lancet. Psychiatry·2020
Same author

New Genetic Loci Associated With Chronic Kidney Disease in an Indigenous Australian Population.

Frontiers in genetics·2019
Same author

The Myth of Mental Illness: 50 years after publication: What does it mean today?

Irish journal of psychological medicine·2018
Same author

Against Explanatory Minimalism in Psychiatry.

Frontiers in psychiatry·2015
Same author

Parallel-Serial Memoing: A Novel Approach to Analyzing Qualitative Data.

Qualitative health research·2015
Same author

Motivational Interviewing Post-Stroke: An Analysis of Stroke Survivors' Concerns and Adjustment.

Qualitative health research·2015

Cognitivist theories struggle to explain intentionality and fail to account for thought insertion. This approach alienates users from their own thoughts, even in non-pathological cases.

Area of Science:

  • Cognitive Science
  • Philosophy of Mind
  • Psychiatry

Background:

  • Cognitivist approaches conceptualize mental states as internal representations within the brain.
  • This framework aims to objectify thoughts, potentially explaining the alienated experience in thought insertion.

Purpose of the Study:

  • To examine the structure of cognitivist accounts of mental states.
  • To evaluate the efficacy of cognitivist models, specifically Frith's, in explaining thought insertion and related phenomena.
  • To identify challenges in explaining the link between internal states and the external world.

Main Methods:

  • Analysis of the general structure of cognitivist theories of intentionality.
  • Examination of Frith's model for passivity phenomena, focusing on internal monitoring failures.

Related Experiment Videos

  • Critique of the models' ability to account for non-pathological cases and paradoxical beliefs.

    • Main Results:

    • Cognitivist theories face a significant challenge in explaining intentionality without circularity.
    • Frith's model for passivity phenomena leads to an infinite regress for non-pathological cases.
    • The models fail to address paradoxical utterances like Moore's paradox.

    Conclusions:

    • Cognitivist approaches provide an alienated view of thought, even in healthy individuals.
    • These models are inadequate for explaining the phenomenon of thought insertion.