What is biology?

The following work compares two different ways of fractionating or abstracting from an organism: (a) a Mendelian way, which views the organism as a discrete bundle of phenotypic characters, each controlled by a corresponding genetic "factor", and (b) as a bundle of particulate molecular fractions, as envisaged by molecular biology. It is generally believed that the latter completely subsumes the former, and that it further serves to subsume all of biology into contemporary physics. We argue herein that the first of these assertions, if true at all, does not follow from an initial positing of an identity between the Mendelian gene and DNA sequence, and may well be false in general. In either case, the second assertion becomes false as well. This has profound consequences, not only for biology, but for the physics which is presumed to underlie it; it constitutes a part of the "new physics" which Erwin Schrôdinger, in a famous essay [(1944) What is Life? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge], argued was inherent in biology.