A model of the synchronic self.

Area of Science:

• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Philosophy of Mind
• Psychology

Background:

• The subjective experience of selfhood encompasses control, boundaries, perspective, and temporal extension.
• Existing models often treat the self as a unified construct, overlooking its component capacities.

Purpose of the Study:

• To propose a cognitive framework for understanding the phenomenology of the self.
• To delineate four dissociable capacities constituting the synchronic self: agentive(B) self, boundary(B) self, agentive(M) self, and boundary(M) self.

Main Methods:

• Theoretical modeling of cognitive capacities.
• Integration of concepts from motor control and body mapping.
• Identification of potential empirical evidence for theoretical constructs.

Main Results:

• The agentive(B) self (bodily control) and agentive(M) self (mental control) are modeled as components of the motor control system.
• The boundary(B) self (bodily boundedness) is modeled as the capacity for integrated body mapping.
• The boundary(M) self (mental boundedness) is proposed for future research, with 'delusion of thought broadcast' as a potential indicator.

Conclusions:

• The phenomenology of the self can be explained by a set of dissociable cognitive capacities.
• Understanding these capacities, particularly the boundary(M) self, offers new avenues for research into selfhood and mental disorders.