Sexual conflict and the evolution of female preferences for indicators of male quality

Males and females have opposing interests when it comes to the honesty of signals used in mate choice. The existence of this sexual conflict has long been acknowledged, but its consequences have not been fully investigated. By applying adaptive dynamics methods and individual-based computer simulations to a standard model for good-genes sexual selection, we show that sexual conflict over condition-dependent signaling can prevent the handicap process from ever attaining an evolutionary equilibrium. We outline the parameter conditions and properties of the underlying genetics conducive to nonequilibrium behavior and discuss the potential of such behavior to explain the elaboration and frequent phylogenetic loss of sexually selected traits. We also evaluate its consequences for well-established insights of sexual selection theory previously shown to apply when female mating preference and male ornament expression do converge on stable equilibrium levels. Contrary to equilibrium expectation, a continual change of condition-dependent signaling enables the evolution of a costly preference for a pure epistatic indicator and the evolution of preferences for redundant signals or a large number of independent ornaments. We thus conclude that seemingly general results of sexual selection theory, insofar as these are based on equilibrium considerations, do not extend to cases where nonequilibrium behavior occurs.