Dynamics of vaccination strategies via projected dynamical systems

Previous game theoretical analyses of vaccinating behaviour have underscored the strategic interaction between individuals attempting to maximise their health states, in situations where an individual's health state depends upon the vaccination decisions of others due to the presence of herd immunity. Here, we extend such analyses by applying the theories of variational inequalities (VI) and projected dynamical systems (PDS) to vaccination games. A PDS provides a dynamics that gives the conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability properties of Nash equilibria. In this paper, it is used to analyse the dynamics of vaccinating behaviour in a population consisting of distinct social groups, where each group has different perceptions of vaccine and disease risks. In particular, we study populations with two groups, where the size of one group is strictly larger than the size of the other group (a majority/minority population). We find that a population with a vaccine-inclined majority group and a vaccine-averse minority group exhibits higher average vaccine coverage than the corresponding homogeneous population, when the vaccine is perceived as being risky relative to the disease. Our model also reproduces a feature of real populations: In certain parameter regimes, it is possible to have a majority group adopting high vaccination rates and simultaneously a vaccine-averse minority group adopting low vaccination rates. Moreover, we find that minority groups will tend to exhibit more extreme changes in vaccinating behaviour for a given change in risk perception, in comparison to majority groups. These results emphasise the important role played by social heterogeneity in vaccination behaviour, while also highlighting the valuable role that can be played by PDS and VI in mathematical epidemiology.