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Four versions of double effect
1Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, Lawrence 66045.
The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy
|October 1, 1991
Summary
This study examines updated versions of the doctrine of double effect, finding that despite improvements, all evaluated formulations remain flawed. The research critically analyzes traditional Catholic and contemporary philosophical interpretations.
Area of Science:
- Moral Philosophy
- Ethics
- Applied Ethics
Background:
- The doctrine of double effect (DDE) is a principle used in ethics to assess the permissibility of actions that have both a good intended effect and a bad foreseen effect.
- Recent scholarship has proposed refined versions of the DDE to address criticisms leveled against earlier formulations.
- This essay focuses on evaluating the robustness of these contemporary DDE versions.
Discussion:
- The essay critically analyzes four distinct versions of the doctrine of double effect.
- These include two traditional Catholic formulations and two prominent modern revisions by Joseph Boyle and Warren Quinn.
- Each version is assessed for its internal consistency and its ability to resolve longstanding philosophical challenges.
Key Insights:
- Despite recent refinements, all four evaluated versions of the doctrine of double effect exhibit significant flaws.
- The analysis reveals persistent difficulties in consistently applying the DDE across various ethical scenarios.
- No single version adequately resolves the core conceptual and practical challenges associated with the doctrine.
Outlook:
- Further philosophical inquiry is needed to develop a more coherent and defensible doctrine of double effect.
- The findings suggest a need to reconsider the foundational assumptions underlying the DDE.
- Future research may explore alternative ethical frameworks or modifications to the DDE to better align with moral intuitions.