[Ethical and philosophical dimensions of decision-making in public health]

Decisions in public health, or in individual health care, are taken by people (individuals or collective) for other people (individuals or collective). Human values, that is to say what is connected to Ethics, should be to the fore, de jure. Too often, under the pretext that they refer to subjectivity, they appear only after very many technical considerations. The latter, in a scientist society, are supposed to deserve a claim to objectivity, this being of course illusory. The author, placing himself in the line of Levinas, Ricoeur, and also of Kant, for whom the "What must I do?" is the most fundamental question any human being has to face, develops four reasons which plead for the pre-eminence of ethics as the foundation of decisions in a policy for public health. 1) He reminds us the intangible values, which are on one side uniqueness and universality of mankind, and on the other side the singularity of the human person. 2) He insists on the ethical wreck which threatens the whole health- and healthcare systems. 3) He sets out some results of modern neurophysiological research (AR Damasio's work), joining an intuition of Aristoteles: the decision making process implies two phases: deliberation the aim of which is to list the different possible actions to undertake, then the choice between those actions. Damasio shows that the lack of emotions inhibits the choice, especially when decision implies human values. 4) Finally, he insists, after E. Morin, on the practical and theoretical difficulties in taking a "good" decision, and on what Morin calls "ecology of action". The results of a decision may completely escape from the decision-makers aims, very often for unexpected social and psychological reasons.