The ecological level of analysis: can neogibsonian principles be applied beyond perception and action?

Is it useful to apply ecological principles, developed to understand perception and action, in research areas such as social psychology? Charles (Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Sciences 43(1) 53-66 2009) warns ecological psychologists interested in this question that much time and effort can be saved through a backwards extension to or rediscovery of the New Realism tradition. In response, we analyze what ecological psychology risks to lose with such a backwards extension and describe existing extensions of the approach not considered by Charles. According to Charles, New Realism holds that: (1) we experience reality, (2) relations are real, and (3) things are what you see when you see those things. Our arguments originate from a comparison of these principles with six recently described ecological ones: (1) organism-environment systems are the proper units of analysis, (2) environmental realities should be defined at the ecological scale, (3) behavior is emergent and self-organized, (4) perception and action are continuous and cyclic, (5) information is specificational, and (6) perception is of affordances (Richardson et al. 2008).