LUCK AND HISTORY-SENSITIVE COMPATIBILISM

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Action
• Metaphysics
• Moral Responsibility

Background:

• Libertarianism requires indeterminism for free will, facing a 'present luck' problem.
• Compatibilism, traditionally seen as avoiding this issue, is re-examined.
• Constitutive luck concerns factors beyond an agent's control in shaping their character.

Purpose of the Study:

• To demonstrate that compatibilism, contrary to common belief, is also susceptible to the problem of present luck.
• To analyze the implications of present luck for history-sensitive compatibilist theories.
• To challenge the adequacy of compatibilist responses to luck in moral responsibility.

Main Methods:

• Philosophical argumentation and conceptual analysis.
• Examination of the causal chains leading to free actions.
• Critique of existing compatibilist frameworks, particularly history-sensitive ones.

Main Results:

• Compatibilism, like libertarianism, faces a significant problem of present luck.
• History-sensitive compatibilism is particularly vulnerable, as the problem of present luck undermines its defense against constitutive luck.
• The identified problem poses a serious challenge to the coherence of certain compatibilist accounts of free will and moral responsibility.

Conclusions:

• The problem of present luck is not exclusive to libertarianism and significantly impacts compatibilism.
• History-sensitive compatibilist theories struggle to adequately address the challenges posed by both present and constitutive luck.
• This analysis necessitates a revision of compatibilist strategies for reconciling free will with determinism and luck.