Decentralized resource allocation to control an epidemic: a game theoretic approach

Area of Science:

• Epidemiology
• Game Theory
• Public Health Policy

Background:

• Resource allocation during epidemics is critical for population protection.
• Understanding strategic interactions between nations is key to managing global health crises.
• Previous models often assumed cooperative behavior, neglecting national self-interest.

Purpose of the Study:

• To model resource allocation by two self-interested countries at the start of an epidemic.
• To analyze strategic decisions aimed at minimizing domestic infections.
• To compare national self-interest outcomes with globally optimal strategies.

Main Methods:

• Game theory framework modeling two players (countries) with selfish objectives.
• Analysis of resource allocation strategies under conditions of a small initial number of infectives.
• Derivation of conditions for convergence between national and global optimization.

Main Results:

• Selfish countries consistently allocate resources to reduce the effective reproduction ratio below one, preventing major outbreaks.
• Identified specific conditions where individual country strategies align with a central planner's global minimization goal.
• Demonstrated that national self-interest can lead to globally optimal outcomes in epidemic control.

Conclusions:

• Strategic, self-interested resource allocation by nations can effectively control epidemic spread.
• The alignment of national and global optimization depends on the preventability of major outbreaks.
• This game-theoretic approach provides insights into international cooperation and resource management during pandemics.