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Novel Object Recognition and Object Location Behavioral Testing in Mice on a Budget

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Nominations for Sale.

Silvia Console-Battilana¹, Kenneth A Shepsle

¹Visiting Professor, IGIER, Bocconi University.

Journal of Theoretical Politics

|December 17, 2009

Summary

This summary is machine-generated.

Presidential and lobbyist contributions can overcome Senate gridlock on nominations. This research models how financial incentives influence senators

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Area of Science:

Political Science
Game Theory
American Politics

Background:

US Senate confirmations often face gridlock due to super-majority requirements.
Empirical evidence shows nominations are frequently successful despite theoretical gridlock.

Purpose of the Study:

To explore how financial contributions from the president and lobbyists can resolve nomination gridlock.
To model the strategic incentives influencing senators' voting behavior.

Main Methods:

Game-theoretic modeling of nomination politics.
Analysis of contribution schemes: conditional on voting profile, individual vote, or outcome.
Examination of indirect lobbying strategies targeting presidential proposal behavior.

Main Results:

Financial inducements can alter senators' voting preferences, leading to nominee confirmation.
The structure of payment schedules (e.g., outcome-contingent) impacts the effectiveness of contributions.
Lobbyists may strategically influence the president rather than directly lobbying senators.

Conclusions:

Nomination gridlock is not an inevitable equilibrium.
Financial incentives play a crucial role in overcoming legislative hurdles in US presidential nominations.
Understanding these incentive structures is key to analyzing political outcomes.