Beyond purely ethical understanding of responsibility: a phenomenological approach

The assumption that moral responsibility is a constitutive feature of the human person could almost be considered as the raison d'être of ethics and consequently of bioethics. In fact, the concept of"common morality", which is becoming ever more popular within the mainstream of bioethics, assumes that certain, even if elementary, experience of moral responsibility (and understanding of it) is shared by all the people of every cultural (moral) tradition. Although the phenomenon of (moral) responsibility is seen as a moral question, its ultimate explanation needs reflection which goes beyond purely ethical considerations.

The phenomenological ontology as elaborated by R. Ingarden is accepted as the theoretical background of deliberations in this study. Methods of reasoning appropriate to this approach to phenomenology are used.

The phenomenon of human responsibility is analyzed--according to Ingarden's suggestion--from the point of view of the four "situations" in which responsibility appears: (I) to be responsible for something, (II) to accept responsibility for something, (III) to be called to responsibility for something, and (IV) to be acting responsibly. The ontological foundation of responsibility in each of these situations is then inquired. Ingarden's philosophical reflection leads to discovery of the ultimate ontological foundation of responsibility in: (I) objective axiology, (II) structure of an acting subject, and (III) a causality structure of reality. We discuss whether Ingarden's analyses are coherent with the concept of "common morality".

Although R. Ingarden is best known, especially to English-speaking readers, for his work in aesthetics, it should be emphasized that his phenomenological ontology can provide interesting insights into the understanding of the concept of responsibility which is fundamental to ethics/bioethics.