What is a species? Essences and generation

Area of Science:

• Philosophy of Biology
• Evolutionary Biology
• Taxonomy

Background:

• Arguments against biological essentialism often misinterpret historical and modern definitions of species.
• Aristotle's concept of species as necessary and sufficient properties is largely irrelevant to contemporary biological research and taxonomy.

Purpose of the Study:

• To re-evaluate the concept of essentialism in biology, particularly in light of modern genetics and evolutionary theory.
• To introduce and define the "Generative Conception of Species" as a more accurate framework.

Main Methods:

• Historical analysis of philosophical and biological definitions of species.
• Examination of objections to natural kinds thinking in early 20th-century biology.
• Conceptual analysis of species concepts from ancient Greece to Darwin and beyond.

Main Results:

• Early objections to essentialism overlooked key biological realities: typical developmental cycles and shared genetic components within species.
• The "Generative Conception of Species" posits that species are defined by a shared generative power leading to resemblance across generations.
• This conception accommodates developmental variations and deviations from the type, aligning with biological reality.

Conclusions:

• Intrinsic biological essentialism is compatible with modern biology and does not necessitate adherence to Aristotelian or rigid modern notions of essence.
• The Generative Conception of Species offers a robust, historically grounded framework for understanding species diversity and evolution.
• The perceived collapse of essentialism in biology is a mischaracterization; a more nuanced understanding, like the Generative Conception, prevails.