[Governance in Guatemalan municipal development councils: an analysis of actors and power relationships]

Decentralisation and other public policies have created public spaces for participation in most Latin-American countries where community representatives, together with municipal authorities and other public functionaries, decide on social investment plans, including health services and infrastructure. The municipal development council system constitutes such public space in Guatemala.

This study analysed such system's governance in a sample of 6 rural municipalities. A descriptive design was used, applying qualitative and quantitative techniques to study three central categories: the strategic actors, the rules of the game and power asymmetry levels amongst actors.

The findings revealed inconsistencies amongst the actors who had to participate according to the legal framework and those actors who actually did so in practice. Divergent interests were also identified for participating which affected the possibility of reaching consensus during decision-making. Analysing the rules of the game led to identifying formal and non-formal mechanisms favouring some actors' ability to influence decisions. Analysing power asymmetry levels led to identifying that community representatives had fewer power resources than institutional representatives (local government and other government organisations). Community representatives also face different barriers blocking their participation and perceive a lesser capacity to influence decision-making.

Existing barriers and fewer power resources experienced by community representatives reduce their abilities to influence decision-making in municipal development councils.