Is there a distinctive care ethics?

Is it true that an ethics of care offers something distinct from other approaches to ethical problems in nursing, especially principlism? In this article an attempt is made to clarify an ethics of care and then to argue that there need be no substantial difference between principlism and an ethics of care when the latter is considered in the context of nursing. The article begins by considering the question of how one could in fact differentiate moral theories. As is explained, this cannot be done merely in light of the moral judgements they defend, nor their ontological commitments (e.g. their view of the nature of persons). Following these methodological beginnings, care-based ethics is described and critically discussed. It is shown that ontological commitments embraced within care ethics do not themselves show that care ethics is distinct from other approaches. The idea of 'psychological care' is also discussed, which stems from the work of Margaret Little. Her claim that the 'gestalts' of justice and care cannot be combined is rejected in favour of an approach that does just that and which has been developed by Joan Tronto. It is then claimed that the moral commitments of principlism are certainly not incompatible with those of an ethics of care in the nursing context. A challenge to the idea that principlism and ethics of care might be compatible is anticipated in the work of Eva Feder Kittay. This challenge is responded to and it is concluded that care considered as a moral orientation and the moral values embedded in principlism are best combined in the nursing context. Care provides a moral orientation over which the obligations referred to in principlism can be laid.