Metacognition and depressive realism: evidence for the level-of-depression account

Introduction. The present study examined the relationship between metacognition (i.e., "thinking about thinking") and depression. More specifically, the depressive realism hypothesis (Alloy & Abramson, 1979), which posits that depressed people have a more accurate view of reality than nondepressed people, was tested. Methods. Nondepressed, mildly depressed, and moderately depressed individuals predicted their memory performance by making judgements of learning after each studied item. These predictions were then compared with actual performance on a free recall task to assess calibration, an index of metacognitive accuracy. Results and conclusions. Consistent with the depressive realism hypothesis, mild depression was associated with better calibration than nondepression. However, this "sadder but wiser" phenomenon appears to only exist to point, as moderate depression and nondepression showed no calibration differences. Thus, the level-of-depression account of depressive realism is supported.