Death and best interests: a response to the legal challenge

In an earlier paper I argued that we do not have an objective conception of best interests and that this is a particular problem because the courts describe that they use an '…objective approach or test. That test is the best interests of the patient' when choosing for children. I further argued that there was no obvious way in which we could hope to develop an objective notion of best interests. As well as this, I argued that a best-interest-based approach was a particular problem around the time of death of some children. A response from a legal perspective argued that, while there is not a clear conception of objective best interests, the courts have a well-described approach to finding a child's objective best interests. In this paper, I argue that without clear agreement on an objective conception of best interests, the courts are unable to locate an objective sense of best interests and that the solutions do not solve the problems that were identified in the initial paper 'Death and best interests'.