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The Collective Trust Game: An Online Group Adaptation of the Trust Game Based on the HoneyComb Paradigm
Published on: October 20, 2022
Cooperation and evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game with institutional incentives
Ross Cressman1, Jie-Wen Song, Bo-Yu Zhang
1Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada. rcressma@wlu.ca
Abstract:
The one-shot public goods game is extended to include institutional incentives (i.e. reward and/or punishment) that are meant to promote cooperation. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium (NE) outcomes predict either partial or fully cooperative behavior in these extended multi-player games with a continuous strategy space. Furthermore, for some incentive schemes, multiple NE outcomes are shown to emerge. Stability of all these equilibria under standard evolutionary dynamics (i.e. the replicator equation and the canonical equation of adaptive dynamics) is characterized.
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